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Abstract: Indonesia has experienced millions of cyber attacks but it has never been able to be handled properly 
and completely, partly because of weak policies and conventional perspectives in understanding cyber threats. 
A country's vital infrastructure is related to a country's national interests, so threats to vital infrastructure are 
tantamount to threatening Indonesia's national interests. The level of use and dependence of a country on 
information and communication technology is directly proportional to the level of security and defense 
vulnerability in a country. Communication network connectivity and information technology cause security in 
this domain to become a separate issue in itself. This study aims to outline the importance of Indonesia to 
establish a national vital infrastructure in Indonesia to prepare Indonesia to face threats in the fifth domain. 
Determination of national vital infrastructure is urgent because it is closely related to the determination of 
jurisdiction, national defense and security policies in the cyber domain. This research is a normative study 
using a comparative approach. The results showed that Indonesia still uses a conventional perspective in 
seeing the form of threats and determining national vital objects as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 
63 the year 2014. Therefore, to face the threats of defense, security as well as national interests of Indonesia 
in the cyber domain, the government needs to evaluate existing policies by the modern threats, as well as to 
establish and define Indonesia's vital national infrastructure. 
Keywords: national interest, security, defense, critical infrastructure, cyber threat.  
 
Urgensi Penetapan Infrastruktur Vital Nasional Indonesia 
 
Abstrak: Indonesia mengalami jutaan serangan cyber namun tidak pernah dapat ditangani dengan baik dan 
tuntas, hal ini diantaranya disebabkan karena lemahnya kebijakan dan perspektif konvensional dalam 
memahami ancaman cyber. Infrastruktur vital suatu Negara sangat terkait dengan kepentingan nasional suatu 
Negara, sehingga ancaman terhadap infrastruktur ini sama artinya dengan mengancam kepentingan nasional 
Indonesia. Tingginya penggunaan dan ketergantungan suatu Negara terhadap teknologi informasi dan 
komunikasi berbanding lurus dengan tingkat kerentanan keamanan dan pertahanan disuatu Negara. 
Konektifitas jaringan komunikasi dan teknologi informasi menyebabkan keamanan di domain ini menjadi 
masalah tersendiri yang kompleks. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguraikan pentingnya Indonesia untuk 
menetapkan dan mendefinisikan infratruktur vital nasional di Indonesia dalam rangka mempersiapkan 
Indonesia menghadapi ancaman pertahanan dan keamanan di domain kelima. Upaya penentuan infrastruktur 
vital nasional ini penting segera dilakukan karena berkaitan erat dengan upaya penentuan yurisdiksi, 
kebijakan pertahanan dan keamanan nasional Indonesia di domain. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian 
normatif dengan menggunakan pendekatan komparatif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia 
masih menggunakan perspektif konvensional dalam melihat bentuk Ancaman dan menentukan objek vital 
nasional sebagaimana diatur dalam Peraturan Presiden No. 63 tahun 2014. Oleh karena itu, dalam rangka 
menghadapi ancaman pertahanan dan keamanan serta kepentingan nasional indonesia di domain cyber maka 
pemerintah perlu mengkaji kembali kebijakan yang ada sesuai bentuk ancaman modern dan menetapkan 
infrastruktur vital nasional milik Indonesia. 




Information technology changes battles that exist in physical domains such as land, sea, air, 
and space by using kinetic weapons into modern wars that are in the virtual domain and use non-
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. Cyber power has now become a major part in new war concepts and doctrines 
based on modern technology. Developed countries have established virtual domains as new war 
domains and become part of their country's sovereignty that must be maintained.  Mastery of this 
capability makes cyber capability the most influential instrument in almost all levels of conflict 
because it is able to provide new techniques to increase the speed, scale and strength of military 
attacks
2
. Cyber attacks are considered very dangerous because they can cause various disturbances 
and physical impacts on humans or other objects without crossing national borders
3
. One of the main 
problems that arise from cyber threats is the anonymity of attacks and connectivity between 
infrastructure networks (both civilian and military). The Office of Science and Technology Policy 
underlines the danger of vulnerability due to the interconnectivity between national infrastructures, 
cybernetics networks are basically a combination of networks, interconnected and interdependent. 
Interactions between these subsystems affect overall network performance. Interactions between 




Currently, Indonesia has experienced millions of cyber attacks but cannot be handled 
properly; this is partly due to the lack of policies related to cyber threats that cause limited 
perspectives on existing cyber threats. Cyber threats even though the attack technique is identical but 
can be distinguished based on the actor, motive, and target of the attack. Some experts in analyzing 
cyber attacks use strict liability and target-based approaches, where both approaches require the 
definition of a country's critical infrastructure. Indonesia currently still uses Presidential Decree No. 
63 year 2004 concerning Security of National Vital Objects. This policy still uses conventional 
perspectives on threats and safeguards against Indonesia's vital objects. Therefore, the government 





This research is a normative legal research with a statue and comparative approach. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. The Impact of Cyber Threat 
The technology revolution has significantly changed the strategic security environment. The 
information technology application in modern society makes the security environment change rapidly 
and significantly, including in the defense sector. The information technology revolution brings 
positive impacts as well as important negative impacts to be aware of in various forms of cyber 
threats. Therefore, this type of threat has become the attention of many countries in the world 
because it is able to provide a real significant threat to the security, defense and national interests of a 
country. 
The urgency of managing threats in this domain encourages countries to prioritize their 
regulatory policies and the budget provided to minimize and protect their cyber domains. For 
example; The UK in carrying out cybersecurity strategy to achieve the vision of "UK is secure and 
resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world" budgeting for 1.9 Billion 
Pounds for 2016-2021, this budget increased from the previous amount of 860 Million Pounds to 
                                                             
1 http://www.economist.com/node/16478792, Accessed 23 September 2018 
2 Schreier, F., 2015. On cyberwarfare. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
3 Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law 
of Cyber-Attack, California Law Review 100, 2012 :817-884. 
4 Schmitt, Michael N., Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative 
Framework (1999). Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 1998-99. 
5 Setiyawan, A. (2018). Penguatan Kebijakan dan Kelembagaan National Cyber Defense dalam Menghadapi Ancaman 
Cyberwarfare di Indonesia (Doctoral dissertation, Sebelas Maret University). 
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carry out cybersecurity strategy for the period April 2011 - March 2016
6
. The budget amount and the 
increase in the budget of each period shows that cyber threats cannot be underestimated; this is also 
confirmed by the National Security Strategy which states that the cyber threat as a Tier One risk to 
United Kingdom interests. According to the British Defense Secretary, this budget is used in 
response to increased cyber threats through the full spectrum of cyber military capabilities to increase 
attack capability, military range capabilities. This defense budget is invested in sophisticated 
capabilities to conduct surveillance and intelligence to keep the country safe
7
. 
Similar to Britain, America considers that the cyber domain as a key sector of the global 
economy because it is able to drive the innovation and economy. On the other hand, the 
developments of information technology confront America with new security challenges that make 
cyber threats a serious and significant threat to national economy and security
8
. The Director of 
National Intelligence stated that the cyber threat is the number 1 strategic threat in the U.S that 
replace the terrorist threat that first appeared in 911
9
. The US cybersecurity budget continues to 
increase every year. In 2017 US cybersecurity provided $ 19 Billons which increased 35% from 2016 
to $ 14 Billion. This budget is used to support a broad-based cybersecurity to secure the government, 
improve the security of important infrastructure and technology, invest in equipment and the future 
labor force and strengthen America in order to better control digital security. In particular, this 
budget is to encourage the Cyber security National Action Plan in order to increase the cybersecurity 
level in the government's digital ecosystem as a whole
10
. The chart shows that cyber threats are one 
of the threats to Indonesia's national defense. The chart is in line with the potential threats chart from 
non-state which shows that cyber threats are increasing every year. 
Chart 1. Indonesian Defense Threat Map 
 
Source : (Hikam, 2014) 
Chart 2. Potential Non-State Threats 
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Schmitt, Michael N., Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative 
Framework (1999). Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 1998-99. 
9 Carter, A., 2015. The Department of Defense cyber strategy. The US Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 
10 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017 
Https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2017-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2017-BUD.pdf Accessed 23 September 2018 
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Source : (Hikam, 2014) 
 
From the data above, the government should increase awareness, speed, and accuracy in 
responding to various forms of threats to the Indonesian defense, including cyber threats. From the 
1990s to the present, various cyberthreat cases such as cyberwarfare and cyber espionage have 
opened many countries' awareness of the importance of a country to be aware of cyber threats which 
are increasingly sophisticated and dangerous and able to influence the security and national interests 
of a country. The success of a cyber attack is not only measured by physical damage, but its impact 
on the stability, economic condition of a country and basic services to civil society such as electricity, 
water, transportation, communication as well as emergency services. Several cases of cyberwarfare, 
including: 
1. North Korea's cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014 is considered as 
the one of the latest cyber attacks that harm American entities. This attack is destructive and also 
copies of unreleased films and thousands of important data containing information about 
celebrities, employees and Sony's business activities
11
. 
2. Russian cyber attacks on the Estonian information technology infrastructure network in 2007, this 
attack almost caused the paralysis of Estonian economic activities due to the high dependence on 
the use of information technology infrastructures in Estonia, including communication, banking 
where the majority of banking transactions in this country are run electronically
12
. 
3. CIA Agent cyber attacks on computer speed control pumps and gas valves worked out of control 
which caused Soviet-owned gas pipelines in the Siberian region to explode and were recorded as 
the largest explosion ever besides a nuclear bomb
13
. 
4. The US and NATO cyber attacks in 1998 succeeded in crippling and deceiving air defense and 
Serbian air traffic controllers before the bomb attack on Serbian targets in Kosovo
14
. In addition, 
it also blocked the Yugoslav communication network during the conflict
15
. A similar strategy was 
                                                             
11 Carter, A., 2015. The DOD cyber strategy. April, 17, p.2015. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-attributes-sony-attack-to-north-korea/2014/12/19/fc3aec60-
8790-11e4-a702-fa31ff4ae98e_story.html?utm_term=.6f29051f949a Accessed 23 September 2018 
12 Muhammad Saleem & Jawad Hassan, “cyber warfare”the truth the real case, Project Report for Information Security 
Course, Linköping Universitetet, Sweden  
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/nov/29/hacking.news Accessed 23 September 2018 
13 http://www.zdnet.com/us-software-blew-up-russian-gas-pipeline-3039147917/,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1455559/CIA-plot-led-to-huge-blast-in-Siberian-gas-
pipeline.html,    
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/computerattack.htm Accessed 23 September 2018 
14Jason Porterfield, 2011.Careers as a Cyberterrorism Expert. The Rosen Publishing Group,  
Jon Schiller, 2010. Cyber Attacks & Protection: Civilization Depends on Internet & Email, CreateSpace. 
15 K. Saalbach, Cyber War; Methods and Practice. Version 6.0-2 January 2013;1-54. 
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used by Israeli aircraft when attacking nuclear facilities in Syria without being detected by the air 
defense radar system in September 2007
16
. 
5. Operation Moon Maze in 1998-2000 by Russia to collect data on computer systems at the 
Universities, Laboratories, Pentagon, NASA and the US Department of Energy
17
. 
6. In 2003 China was allegedly behind the Titan Rain virus attack on America. This attack attacks 
computer networks of several American defense contractors such as Lockhead Martin, Sandia 
National Laboratories, Redstone Arsenal and even attempts to attack NASA and the FBI to 
retrieve their important information including army helicopter specifications, falconview (flight 
plan programs) and aerospace documents. 
In 2009 China allegedly carried out a systematic and large-scale cyber attack known as Operation 
Aurora and GhostNet. GhostNet is a large-scale espionage operation against 103 countries around 
the world including international organizations. This virus successfully infected 1295 computers 
around the world where 30% of the targets were of high value related to military, economic, 
political and diplomatic activities. This virus attacked several embassies including Indonesia, 
South Korea, Taiwan, India, Thailand, Pakistan, and Germany. This virus also attacked the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Bhutan, Iran, Brunei. The virus has the 
ability to activate and control the webcam, infected computer microphones, while Operation 
Aurora is used to accessing computer programs, the source code of the information technology 
sector, security and defense companies. in early 2011 this virus allegedly attacked the Canadian 
government official network which caused the Canadian government's financial department 
network to be offline temporarily. 
China also allegedly carried out a large-scale cyber attacks known as Operation Night Dragon 
and Operation Shady Rat against oil, energy and petrochemical companies and 72 organizations 
in the world for 6 years since July 2006. 
7. Cyber attacks reportedly carried out by the US and Israel against Iran's Uranium enrichment 
facility program through the Stunext virus in 2010
18
. Both countries allegedly attacked Iranian 
and Middle Eastern Government Offices using Virus Flame which able to activate all equipment 
connected to computer and communication networks with spying purposes
19
. 
8. Cyber attacks on Saudi Aramco Oil Company companies that damage and delete sensitive data 
through Shamoon Malware as well as attacks on banks and television stations in South Korea that 
damage and delete data owned through destructive malware 
20
. 
9. Cyber attacks after the incident between Chinese and American warplanes in 2001, provoked 
Chinese hackers to release the Code Red and Code Red II worm viruses which caused a loss of $ 
2 million and infect 600,000 computers
21
. In 2007 and 2008 foreign countries' cyber operations 
were unknown to the information systems of American defense contractors; they managed to 
retrieve several terabytes of F-35 aircraft designs and electronic systems data. In 2011 the US 
                                                             
16 Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel. The 
Law of Cyber-Attack.California Law Review [Vol. 100:817-2012] 
17 Blakely, B. A. (2012). Cyberprints: identifying cyber attackers by feature analysis. 




http://www.antaranews.com/berita/313053/virus-the-flame-serang-iran. Accessed 23 September 2018 
20 Kolonel (AU) Rudy Gultom, 2015, Legitimasi Badan Cyber Nasional (BCN)  Sebagai Pusat Komando Dan Kendali 
Kerjasama Antar Instansi Di Indonesia Guna Menghadapi Tantangan Cyberspace Dan Cybersecurity  Dalam Rangka 
Melindungi Kepentingan Dan Ketahanan Nasional, National Cybersecurity Symposium. 
21 K. Saalbach, Cyber War; Methods and Practice. Version 6.0-2 January 2013;1-54.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-chinese-jet.html?pagewanted=all 
Accessed 23 September 2018 
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ministry stated the theft of 24,000 files consisting of data tanks, airplanes, submarines, avionics, 
surveillance technology, satellite communication systems, and network security protocols
22
. 
10. The Stunext is referred as the world's most sophisticated cyber weapon23. This virus was 
allegedly made by the US and Israel in conducting a joint operation called "Olympic Games" 
which was designed to infect industrial control systems, especially in SCADA automation 
software (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) (majority) made in Germany which is 
widely used in industrial fields
24
. This virus is estimated to have infected around 15,000-20,000 
computers worldwide where the majority of infected systems are in Iranian countries, other than 
Indonesia, America, India, Australia, Pakistan
25
. In Iran, the virus infected Iran's nuclear 
facilities, causing damage to 385 centrifuges of uranium enrichment, which caused the efficiency 
of uranium enrichment to decrease by 30%
26
. Besides this virus infects 13,336 computers in 
Indonesia, 6552 computers in India, 2913 computers in America, 2436 computers in Australia, 
1038 computers in the UK, 1013 computers in Malaysia and 993 computers infected in 
Pakistan
27
. Indonesia became the second largest country hit by this virus, but the motive and 
impact of the virus attack were unknown, especially to Indonesia, although this virus was also 




These cases show how cyber attacks can be used systematically to disrupt and weaken the 
defense systems, public infrastructure systems, economic systems, and other national vital 
infrastructure networks related to the safety and security of a country. In addition, cyber attacks cause 
high economic losses and increase every year. According to cybersecurity ventures, in 2017 global 
economic losses due to cyber attacks of $ 3 Trillion are predicted to reach $ 6 Trillion every year 
starting in 2021. This loss count includes damage and data destruction, lost productivity, stolen 
money, theft of personal and financial data, fraud, theft of intellectual property, embezzlement, post-
attack disruption, forensic investigation, restoration and deletion of hacked data and systems, and 
reputational harm
29
. In a report in 2017, the Cost of Cybercrime Study conducted by the 2017 
institute phenomenon in seven countries including America, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, 
and Australia shows America is at the top of the country experiencing the highest losses with average 
losses. Annually reaching $ 21 million and Australia in the lowest position with annual average 
losses of $ 5.41 Million
30
. From the study, the value of losses experienced by industry shows that the 
financial services sector ranks top followed by utilities and energy then aerospace and defense. 
                                                             
22 Chen, T.M., 2013. An assessment of the department of defense strategy for operating in cyberspace. Army War College 
Carlisle Barracks Pa Strategic Studies Institute. 
23 Lindsay, J.R., 2013. Stuxnet and the limits of cyber warfare. Security Studies, 22(3), pp.365-404. 
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/, http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-
dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11?IR=T&r=US&IR=T, http://newatlas.com/south-korea-stuxnet-cyber-
weapon/30977/ Accessed 23 September 2018 
24 http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1343/stuxnet-the-worlds-first-cyber-boomerang,  
http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/alex-gibney-film-gives-chilling-insight-into-the-world-of-state-
sponsored-cyber-warfare-unleashed-by-stuxnet/news-story/a7063ae03dcb5cd6ed2a576d6a8ea9dc,  
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet Accessed 23 September 2018 
25http://teknologi.news.viva.co.id/news/read/166993-trojan-scada-hantui-iran-indonesia-india, 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/222505/apa-itu-stuxnet Accessed 23 September 2018 
26Michael Holloway. Stuxnet Worm Attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities.Submitted as coursework for PH241, Stanford 
University, Winter 2015 
27 Richardson, J., 2011. Stuxnet as cyberwarfare: applying the law of war to the virtual battlefield. J. Marshall J. Computer 
& Info. L., 29, p.1. 
28  http://teknologi.news.viva.co.id/news/read/166993-trojan-scada-hantui-iran-indonesia-india 
 Accessed 23 September 2018 
29 https://cybersecurityventures.com/2015-wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2017-Cybercrime-Report.pdf Accessed 23 
September 2018 
30https://www.accenture.com/t20170926T072837Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-61/Accenture-2017-
CostCyberCrimeStudy.pdf Accessed 23 September 2018 
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In Indonesia in 2012 to 2014 the economic losses incurred reached Rp. 33,299 billion
31
 and increased 
to Rp. 194.6 billion from 2015 to 2016 and this number will increase every year
32
. The cyber attacks 
impacts should be a future lesson in dealing with potential cyber threats that are far more dangerous 
and complex. The attack shows clearly how cyber attacks can be used systematically, effectively and 
efficiently in weakening, disrupting systems related to defense, security, economic conditions and 
political conditions of a country. There are no politically motivated cyber attacks on Indonesia that 
can be handled properly and only a few attacks on economically motivated cases that can be handled 
indicate ineffective policies and institutions that should be able to deal with these complex threats. 
Therefore, the government immediately takes steps to deal with cyber threats which are increasingly 
sophisticated, systematic and more dangerous. This effort is carried out by strengthening the policy 
and integrated institutions in addressing cyber threats in the future. Weak policies create a lot of legal 
loopholes so that the handling of cyber threats becomes ineffective and often misguided because 
there are no separate domains of enforcement and handling of threats and "unknown" levels of cyber 
attacks on Indonesia. The weakness of the existing policies also influences the narrow viewpoint, 
which leads to the weakness of the relevant institutions that are authorized to handle cyber threats. 
Cyber domain is multidomain of almost all institutions related to Indonesia's defense, security and 
national interests. Therefore this domain must be managed by many relevant institutions because of 
its multispectrum nature. Furthermore, the international convention is required to regulate 
cyberwarfare by developing the existing international law principles or by expanding the definition 
and scope of conventional war provisions.  This provision will harmonize the perspective and 
understanding in order to minimize debate and interpretation so that it can provide maximum 
protection to the population and civilian objects. 
 
2. Cyberattack Analysis Apporach 
To analyze the use of non-conventional weapons there are three models of analysis, including; 
Instrument based, Consequence-based and Strict Liability
33
. The instrument-based approach views 
whether damage/harm/destruction caused by a previous attack method can be obtained by kinetic 
attacks. For instance cyber attacks to disable electricity networks are automatically qualified as 
armed attacks because in general to disable the electricity network is carried out by dropping bombs 
on power plants. According to the consequence-based approach, equating cyber attacks with kinetic 
attacks is irrelevant and attention should be focused on the cyber attacks impact on the country. Such 
as cyber attacks to manipulate banking and economic service information so that disrupting trade in a 
country can be declared an armed attack. Manipulating information is not same as the kinetic attack 
but if the consequences can disrupt a country's economic activities it is considered as armed attack. 
According to the strict liability approach, cyber attacks on vital infrastructure are automatically 
considered as armed attacks. This approach was proposed by W.G. Sharp to justify the anticipation of 
"self-defense" before the harmful/dangerous impacts arise from the potential of cyber attacks. He 
stated that "... the penetration by the state into sensitive computer systems such as command and 
control systems, missile defense computer systems, and other computers that maintain the safety and 
reliability of a nuclear stockpile, should be by their very nature be presumed a demonstration of 
hostile intent ... "
34
. Duncan Holis uses 3 approaches to determine when a cyber attack can be called 
the use of armed force. First, the "instrumentality approach" approach, which argues that cyber 
                                                             
31 https://inet.detik.com/security/d-3081840/kerugian-akibat-kejahatan-cyber-tembus-usd-150-miliar Accessed 23 
September 2018 
32 https://www.merdeka.com/teknologi/ini-jumlah-kerugian-finansial-korban-kejahatan-cyber.html Accessed 23 September 
2018 
33 Kazinec, D., 2011. Issues of cyber warfare in international law (Doctoral dissertation, Mykolas Romeris University). 
34 Elin Jansson Holmberg, armed attack in cyberspace: do they exist and can they trigger the rights to self 
defense?.Thesis.Stockholm University.  2015 
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attacks cannot be categorized as armed attacks in accordance with article 2 (4) because they do not 
have physical characteristics associated with military attacks. Second, the "target-based approach", 
that cyber attacks are considered as armed attack if the attack penetrates the vital national 
infrastructure system even though the attack does not cause physical harm or loss of life. According 
to him, this is an inclusive approach because the nature of cyber attacks has a broad impact. Third, 
"consequence approach", this approach emphasizes on the consequence of cyber attacks. Cyber 
attacks that are intended to have an impact that is usually generated by kinetic power can be referred 
to as an armed attack. According to Sharon, this approach does not take into account the damage 
caused by cyber attacks which, despite causing little physical damage. He states that; "A cyber attack 
that shuts down any part of a nation’s critical infrastructure may have an effect that is much more 
debilitating than a traditional military attack. The threat in such a situation may be more terrorizing 




3. Critical Infrastucture Definition in several countries 
Indonesia does not use the term "vital infrastructure" but uses the term "national vital object". 
Presidential Decree No. 63 year 2004 defines national vital objects as areas/locations, 
buildings/installations and/or businesses that related to life sustainability, the state interests and/or 
strategic resources of state income. Included in the category of national vital objects are objects that 
produce daily basic needs; threats and disturbances to it result in casualties against humanity and 
development; threats and disturbances to it result in national transportation and communication 
chaos; and/or threats and disturbances to it result in disruption of the administration of government. 
The definition is still very limited and uses a tangible point of view, even though national vital 
objects have broad categories. This affects the security model and response of the authorities if there 
is a cyber attack on the national vital object. Infrastructure can be referred to as a vital infrastructure 
if the disruption to the infrastructure can result in a significant socio-economic crisis and potentially 
undermine the stability of a society, causing a political, strategic and security impact. There are three 
factors used to define vital infrastructure, namely; the symbolic importance of the infrastructure, the 
immediate dependence on infrastructure and the complex dependencies36.  To define national vital 
objects, we can compare several definitions of vital infrastructure that exist in other countries and 
international organizations. In comparison, the US in the Presidential Decision Directives - PPD 63 
1998 defines vital infrastructure as: “Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based 
systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. Critical Infrastructure 
include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, transportation, energy, finance and banking, 
water systems and emergency services, both private and governmental” 
37
. The USA PATRIOT Act 
2001 defines critical infrastructure as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
U.S that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
national economic security, national security, national public health or safety, or any combination of 
those matters
38
.  The United States has 16 sectors which are included in the category of vital 
infrastructure whose assets, systems, networks both physical and virtual whose inability or damage 
will affect the national security, national economy, public health or safety or a combination of these 
impacts. In the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-21, several sectors were included in the 
critical infrastructure category and appointed sector-specific agencies (SSA): 
                                                             
35 Christopher D. DeLuca, he Need for International Laws of War to Include Cyber Atacks Involving State and Non-State 
Actors, 3 Pace Int’l L. Rev. Online Companion 278 (2013). 
36 Tabansky, L., 2011. Critical Infrastructure Protection against cyber threats. Military and Strategic Affairs, 3(2), p.2. 
37 Presidential Decission Directives/PPD-63 Year 1998 https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm diakses Januari 2018 
38 H.R.3162 - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001  
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Table I. Critical Infrastructure & SSA 
No Sector Sector Specific Agencies 
1 Chemical Sector Department of Homeland Security 
2 Commercial Facilities Sector Department of Homeland Security 
3 Communications Sector Department of Homeland Security 
4 Critical Manufacturing Sector Department of Homeland Security 
5 Dams Sector Department of Homeland Security 
6 Defense Industrial Base Sector Department of Defense 
7 Emergency Services Sector Department of Homeland Security 
8 Energy Sector Department of Energy 
9 Financial Services Sector Department of the Treasury 
10 
Food and Agriculture Sector 
U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and 
Human Services 
11 
Government Facilities Sector 
Department of Homeland Security and General Services 
Administration 
12 Healthcare and Public Health Sector Department of Health and Human Services 
13 Information Technology Sector Department of Homeland Security 
14 Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste Sector 
Department of Homeland Security 
15 
Transportation Systems sector 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Transportation 
16 Water and Wastewater Systems 
Sector 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Source : (Presidential Policy Directive 21, 2013) 
According to PPD-21, The Office of Infrastructure Protection leads and coordinates national 
programs and policies on the security and resilience of vital infrastructure while building strong 
partnerships across government agencies and the private sector. This office is also responsible for 
conducting and facilitating vulnerability and impact assessments to help understand and deal with 
risks to these vital infrastructures
39
. In this PPD-21 there are 3 strategies to strengthen the security 
and resilience of vital infrastructure, namely; Enable effective information exchange by identifying 
baseline data and systems requirements for the Federal Government; Refine and clarify functional 
relationships across the Federal Government to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen 
critical infrastructure security and resilience; and  Implement an integration and analysis function to 
inform planning and operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure
40
. 
Malaysia uses the term Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) and defines it as those 
assets (real and virtual), systems and functions that are vital to their nation's destruction. They will 
have a devastating impact on
41
: 
1. National defense and security; guarantee sovereignty and independence whilst maintaining 
internal security. 
2. National image; Projection of national image towards enhancing stature and sphere of influence. 
3. Government capability to functions; maintain order to perform and deliver minimum essential 
public services. 
4. National economic strength; Confidence that the nation's key growth area can successfully 
compete in global market while maintaining favourable standards of living. 
5. Public health and safety; delivering and managing optimal health care to the citizen 
                                                             
39 https://www.dhs.gov/office-infrastructure-protection Accessed 23 September 2018 
40 Obama, B., 2013. Presidential policy directive 21: Critical infrastructure security and resilience. Washington, DC. 
41 https://cnii.cybersecurity.my/main/about.html Accessed 23 September 2018 
UNIFIKASI : Jurnal Ilmu Hukum,   p-ISSN 2354-5976, e-ISSN 2580-7382 




European Union defines Critical infrastructure as “Means an asset, system or part thereof 
located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, security, 
safety, health, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which 
would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those 
functions”. Critical infrastructure is defined as a European Critical Infrastructure if a vital 
infrastructure in a member country which if disturbed or destroyed will have a significant impact on 
at least 2 member countries. The significance of the impact is assessed based on cross-cutting 
criteria
42
. Included in the European Critical Infrastructure covers 2 major sectors and their sub-
sectors, illustrated in the table as follows; 




Infrastructures and facilities for generation and transmission of electricity in 
respect of supply electricity 
Oil Oil production, refining, treatment, storage and transmission by pipelines 
Gas 






Inland waterways transport 
Ocean and short-sea shipping and ports 
Source : (EU Commission, 2008) 
From these definitions there are several similar patterns that are used to define critical 
infrastructure, including that (1) protected objects are tangible and intangible (virtual, system, 
program) objects, (2) attacks on both objects are considered to disturb the security and national 
interests, (3) efforts to influence, disrupt and disable an infrastructure that is not limited to destructive 
attacks which are considered as attacks on the state, (4) all fields categorized as vital objects are 
objects related to security state, governance, supporting and sustaining the national economy, the 
interests of fulfilling the basic needs of the people. 
Therefore, Presidential Decree No. 63 year 2004 concerning national vital objects must be 
reviewed, including a security model to deal with cyber threats against all vital objects and objects 
that have not been categorized as vital obedience but have fulfilled these categories. At least the 
government must determine 11 critical infrastructure, including the Defense and Security Sector, 
Government Sector, Transportation Sector, Financial Services Sector, Health Sector, Technology, 
Information & Communication Sector, Energy Sector, Water Sector, Defense Industry Sector, 
Manufacturing Sector, Food & Agriculture Sector. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Interconnection of information and communication technology infrastructure networks, 
both civil and military, makes the security of vital national infrastructure increasingly vulnerable. 
The government must immediately improve policies on national vital objects that still use 
conventional approaches in understanding modern threats. By establishing a national vital 
infrastructure, efforts to protect national interests and sovereignty of Indonesia in the cyber domain 
with a combination approach of strict liability and consequence based approach can be carried out. In 
                                                             
42 EU Commission, 2008. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation 
of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. Official Journal of the 
European Union. 
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